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The current president of the United States, Donald Trump, vocally supported the use of torture
on terrorist suspects during the 2016 presidential election when he stated, “I will bring back
waterboarding, and I will bring back a hell of a lot worse than waterboarding” (Myre 2018). And
in 2018, President Trump nominated Gina Haspel to be the director of the Central Intelligence
Agency. Haspel is an individual who was previously in charge of operating a CIA “black site”
where the enhanced interrogation program was used on terrorist suspects. Although it is
undisputed that the United States of America was severely violated by the terrorist attacks on
September 11th, many of the controversial “enhanced” interrogation methods that the
government has used on terrorists since that time fulfill the criteria necessary to be deemed
torture; these techniques should not be utilized for any purposes as there are other interrogation
options available that are far more productive and humane.
Regarding interrogation, there is a science and an art to successfully drawing information from
suspects and prisoners without the use of any physical force. The body language of people who
are trying to hide information often inadvertently changes; sometimes, their eyes blink at
irregular intervals, there is a shiftiness in their movements, or minuscule nervous ticks such as
foot-tapping and nail-biting are present. A proficient interrogator may pick up on these
subconscious movements. He may also be so skilled in the art of questioning that he can phrase
interrogatives in such a way that suspects will reveal vast amounts of information by their use of
verb tense and word choice. Veteran interrogators do not frequently fail to learn something from
suspects, even when not using physical force. Heather MacDonald writes on the subject,
“Pentagon doctrine, honed over decades of cold-war planning, held that 95 percent of prisoners
would break upon straightforward questioning.”(MacDonald 2006, 84). Thus, simply asking
suspects and prisoners questions in a skillful manner is often sufficient by itself as a technique
for information gathering—so thought the government and virtually everyone else. However, the
“terrorist” posed to be a much more challenging form of interrogee than any enemy before it. Al
Qaeda fighters captured in Iraq or Afghanistan were not giving up information. They were not
cooperating. Instead, they were silent, unmoving, and often knew that the interrogators’ hands
were tied (MacDonald 2006, 85). In a war where acquiring information was urgently necessary,
the enemy of the United States was far from ideal.
As a result, the United States government resorted to rather unconventional and intense practices
to get the silent enemy talking. It should be noted that the government cannot be blamed for
prioritizing urgency as some detainees undoubtedly knew where Improvised Explosive Devices
(IEDs) awaited American convoys and knew where their dangerous radical-Islamic friends were
hiding. However, exigency alone does not necessarily justify the following tactics green-lighted
for use on detainees at various American facilities and beyond: waterboarding, rectal feeding and
rehydration, sexual humiliation, beatings, intensive fear-up procedures, and extraordinary
rendition.
The aforementioned methods are clearly prohibited according to the Eighth Amendment, the
Geneva Conventions, and the Convention Against Torture from use on suspected and convicted
criminals within U.S. borders and on enemy-state actors who qualify for prisoner-of-war status;
this is not without reason as these tactics do, at prima facie, meet the criteria to be deemed
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torturous and unlawful against protected persons. The Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution reads, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.” This amendment was written and historically considered
with a two-fold purpose: to prevent numerous and arbitrary financial punishments and barbaric
and indecent physical punishments from being inflicted on individuals within U.S. territory. The
Third Geneva Convention relates to the treatment of prisoners of war. In Article 4, it explicates
“prisoner of war” as anyone captured by the enemy who is an official member of an armed force
participating in the conflict; anyone who is a member of a militia or volunteer corps that is
included in armed forces; anyone belonging to a militia, volunteer corps, or resistance movement
functioning outside of their own territory; anyone who accompanies the armed forces without
being an official member thereof; and any locals who spontaneously take up arms to resist
invading forces. Regarding these individuals’ protections, Article 14, Respect for the Person of
Prisoners, states that “[p]risoners of war are entitled in all circumstances to respect for their
persons and their honour.” In a commentary on Article 14, the International Committee of the
Red Cross explains respect for the physical person of the prisoner as the prohibition of killing,
wounding, or endangering prisoners of war (ICRC 1960). It also includes protection from “…any
direct injury: blows, torture, cruelty, mutilation, medical or scientific experiments which are not
in the interest of the prisoner” (ICRC 1960). The Third Geneva Convention paints with a
seemingly wide brush in its inclusion of categories of actors that qualify for POW status and also
in its protection of those persons. Article 32 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, relating to the
protection of civilian populations, states, “Like murder, torture is one of the acts listed in Article
147 as a ‘grave breach’.”
The Geneva Conventions very clearly prohibit any form of torture and cruel treatment of POWs,
civilians, and participant enemies who have surrendered. They go to great lengths to ensure the
protection of basic human rights for individuals and groups who may, in times of war, be
susceptible to having those rights violated. If any specific party could reinterpret Geneva to
allow torture, then that party could reinterpret anything. Likewise, the United Nations’s
“Convention Against Torture” (CAT) sought to achieve similar goals with a greater emphasis on
torture. The document was ratified by the United States in 1994. It contains 53 articles outlining
the inherent rights of human beings and the responsibilities of governments to protect people
against torturous and inhumane treatment. The CAT explicitly prohibits agreeing parties,
including the United States, from making any circumstantial exceptions or justifications for
torture by invoking authority (Article 2) or practicing rendition (Article 3).
After a look at the U.S. Constitution and two international treaties related to torture, it certainly
seems to be clear that criminals in U.S. territory may not be subject to any cruel and unusual
tactics; the wide array of persons who qualify for prisoner-of-war status are protected from all
forms of torture and cruelty in all circumstances; civilians and surrendered enemies may not be
murdered or subject to inhumane, humiliating, or cruel treatment for any reason; no person may
be extradited to a state where it is believed torture will take place; and no person may be subject
to severe pain or suffering to draw out information or to punish by an individual acting in the
capacity of a public official—no exceptions.
How then did the United States government seem to get it all so wrong? —because it wanted to.
In order to justify using unlawful tactics—clearly forbidden by the previously mentioned
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conventions—for interrogations in the War on Terror, the George W. Bush administration
assigned the enemy a new status and adopted unreasonable criteria for what counts as torture in
order to bypass nearly all legal restrictions and prohibitions; the infamous “Torture Memo” from
the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) gave the go ahead for agents of the state to use virtually any
tactics they saw fit on terrorist suspects and prisoners. One of the primary steps of the
justification process was to assign captured enemies of the War on Terror a status that is
unprotected by the Geneva Conventions and the Convention Against Torture (Office of the
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, 2003). The OLC also specified that Congress could not
interfere with the President acting in his role as Commander in Chief , who subsequently
concluded that Al Qaeda and the Taliban were to be referred to and treated
as unlawful and illegal combatants. Regarding which actions were then prohibited against
unlawful combatants, the OLC made the determination that the U.S. Military, the Central
Intelligence Agency, and other agents of the state could not be restricted by criminal statutes
barring “simple assault” and other use-of-force violations, specifically 18 U.S.C.§ 113, as long as
they had no intent to commit murder during interrogations and were outside U.S. territorial
jurisdiction. Throughout the rest of the memorandum, the OLC continued this same pattern of
finding loopholes in any laws, treaties, and regulations that would normally prohibit cruel and
unusual conduct and arguably torture.
The Office of Legal Counsel may have been successful in bypassing legal barriers to
government-sanctioned torture, but it had no way of changing the proven ineffective nature of
using the tactic as an interrogation tactic. A victim who is being tyrannized, dominated, and
humiliated does cooperate to some degree—but not often in the sense that he or she unveils a
real knowledge about requested information. Instead, he fabricates information that will get the
oppression to stop. For example, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, one of the masterminds behind the
September 11th terrorist attacks, was waterboarded by U.S. intelligence agents during
interrogations. He confessed to and took credit for 31 different terrorist operations including 9/11
and the beheading of journalist Daniel Pearl. However, experts argue that no single terrorist, not
even one as distinguished as Mohammed, could be responsible for 31 separate plots (Stern 2007,
217). Some people may argue that he deserves everything he gets for any level of responsibility
or involvement with September 11th, but the issue is not whether men like
Mohammed deserve torturous treatment. The problem is that if a small number of high-value
detainees are confessing, when tortured, to numerous atrocious crimes they did not commit on
top of those offenses that they did commit, then many of the individuals who are truly
responsible are walking freely today and investigations that should not be closed are closing. It is
important for several reasons that intelligence-gathering agencies use the most effective tactics at
their disposal to ensure the best possible sense of security rather than an illusion of it.
In 2009, President Barack Obama banned torture with an executive order. In 2015, Congress
succeeded in passing its own torture ban into law. The current Army Field Manual does not
allow torture, and, more specifically, it does not allow waterboarding (Myre 2018). For about a
decade now, the CIA has not used the tactics that were once a part of its enhanced interrogation
program (Timsit 2018). However, there is a distinct set of highly effective interrogation tactics
that the United States government used within the CIA’s program that was often categorized by
critics and the public as “torture,” though not rightfully so. These tactics were far more humane
and infinitely more productive; they are called stress techniques. Unfortunately, when the
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interrogation program was heavily criticized, with good reason, and the Abu Ghraib scandal
broke, many effective stress techniques were thrown out alongside torturous ones (MacDonald
2006, 93). “Stress techniques” is a broad category used to describe tactics such as stress
positions, minor sleep deprivation, irritably monotonous conditions, etc. These methods
maximize the effectiveness of an interrogation while minimizing negative physical and
psychological effects on interrogees. The CIA describes stress positions as “producing mild
physical discomfort from prolonged muscle use, rather than pain associated with contortions or
twisting of the body (CIA 2002).”
The activities that fit under this rubric (e.g., subject sits on the floor with legs extended and arms
above his or her head) are far from sadistic and are quite possibly even similar to what an
individual might witness if he or she were observing an aerobics class at the YMCA. The CIA
memo involving the description of stress positions also includes instructions for the appropriate
use of sleep deprivation. It explains that preventing sleep for controlled periods of time reduces
the ability of suspects to think and react quickly and motivates them to cooperate with
interrogators. The effects of sleep deprivation are remitted by simply allowing detainees to have
a normalized sleep schedule for one to two days. The side effects are minimal and counteracting
them is effortless. In the case of Mohamed al-Kahtani, a Saudi who had fought alongside some
of the bin Laden bodyguards, interrogators gathered outside his cell and sang “Time Is on My
Side” by the Rolling Stones for lengths of time or played Metallica songs through a stereo. After
18 hours of these methods accompanied by questioning, Kahtani became convinced that he was
sold out by his partners and gave up information about several most-wanted terrorists, including
Usama bin Laden (MacDonald 2006, 90, 92). On another occasion, a young bomb maker who
had been blowing up aid workers was being held by the U.S. government; he was told to stand
up until he gave up the name of another certain high-value suspect. Then, the interrogator sat
down and began reading a book. Several hours later, the detainee was terrified, gave up his
friend, and disclosed information on where he had planted bombs. The interrogator merely made
the man stand up while, in the meantime, he read a book. Furthermore, when sleep deprivation
was used as an interrogation tactic, intelligence gatherers doing the questioning were awake for
the same amount of time as the detainees being questioned (MacDonald 2006, 87-88).
The United States government encountered a new kind of enemy in the War on Terror, resulting
in conditions of exigency and uncertainty. Consequently, individuals in charge panicked, covered
their legal bases to justify illegal acts, and used inhumane treatment on human beings. Did
torture save some lives? Possibly. Did it cause the destruction of others? Certainly. The
descriptions of the torture tactics used by the CIA, and facts about the facilities in which they
were carried out are evidence of this. The prime concern is not only that torture is generally
illegal for good reason, but it is often ineffective for confessions and information gathering
because unbearable pain often prevents authentic results. The only methods that proved to be
tried and true on terrorists were stress techniques, which are also more humane.
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